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I. Introduction 
The following is an update on Louisiana’s legislative activity and case 
law relating to oil and gas, and mineral law from August 1, 2015 to July 1, 
2016. 
II. Case Law 
A. Local Government Ordinances 
In 2014, the Commissioner of the Office of Conservation of the State of 
Louisiana approved a drilling unit to be located in a residential area 
designated as the “A-3 Suburban District” in St. Tammany Parish.1 
Previously in 2007, St. Tammany Parish had adopted the St. Tammany 
Parish Unified Development Code, and in 2010, Ordinance No. 10-2408 
was passed that rezoned unincorporated areas of the parish.2 The property 
in question fell within that zoned area and had been used as a tree farm for 
the last thirty years with no structures within a mile radius of the proposed 
well site.3 The Parish filed suit against the Commissioner alleging that the 
zoning designation made drilling illegal.4 
The trial court ruled in favor of Helis Oil finding that La. R.S. 30:28F 
preempted any local zoning ordinance insofar as it applies to oil and gas 
activity.5 The state law in question specifically prohibited other 
                                                                                                             
 1. St. Tammany Parish Gov’t v. Welch, 2015-1152, 2016 WL 918361, at *1 (La. App. 
1 Cir. 3/9/2016). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at *2. 
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governmental agencies from interfering with drilling in the exploration of 
minerals.6 The appellate court looked to the Louisiana Constitution, which 
stated that the legislature may enact laws regarding natural resources in 
ways that protect the health and safety of its citizens.7 As a result, the 
legislature has enacted laws that extensively regulate oil and gas 
exploration and has created the Office of Conservation to be responsible for 
that regulation.8 
St. Tammany Parish argued that Article VI of the Louisiana Constitution 
allowed local governments to designate land for specific purposes and that 
the La. R.S. 30:28F did not preempt their authority to do so.9 The appellate 
court found that a state law will preempt local law when it is the “clear and 
manifest purpose of the legislature to do so.” 10 Unless expressly forbidden, 
local government’s law will prevail. La. R.S. 30:28F specifically prohibits 
another political agency from interfering with drilling.11 The court also 
stated that because the legislature has created an extensive regulation of 
drilling, to allow conflict could possibly be dangerous.12 The Court went on 
to state that the Commissioner of Conservation’s powers are police powers 
and cannot be undermined.13 Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Helis Oil.14 
B. Depth Limitation Language 
At issue in BRP LLC v. MC Louisiana Minerals LLC was depth 
limitation language contained in an assignment from International Paper 
Company (“IP”) to Chesapeake Royalty, LLC (“Chesapeake”).15 IP owned 
land in Louisiana and sought to sell the mineral holdings in that land. 
Chesapeake approached IP to buy those interests and entered into a letter of 
intent to purchase with IP on June 30, 2008.16 On July 24, 2008, the 
purchase and sale agreement was finalized, in which the assets sold were 
defined as: 
                                                                                                             
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at *3. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at *5. 
 15. BRP LLC v. Louisiana Minerals LLC, 50,549-CA, 2016 WL 2903566, at *1 (La. 
App. 2d Cir. May 18, 2016). 
 16. Id. 
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[A]ll of Sellers’ right, title and interest in and to (a) the oil, gas 
and other minerals in, to and under the land described in the 
attached Exhibit A, and any and all oil and gas leases covering 
such lands, INSOFAR AND ONLY INSOFAR as such oil, gas 
and other minerals are located below that depth which is the 
stratigraphic equivalent of the base of the Cotton Valley 
Formation and the top of the Louark Group defined as 
correlative to a depth of 10,765’ in the Winchester Samuels 23 
#1 well (API #1703124064) located in Section 23-14N-13W, 
DeSoto Parish, LA, and correlative to a depth of 9,298’ in the 
Tenneco Baker #1 well (API #1701320382) located in Section 
12-16N-10W, Bienville Parish, LA…17 
IP then assigned its interests to BRP, LLC (“BRP”), who argued that IP 
had only intended to sell rights in the Haynesville Shale and lower depths to 
Chesapeake.18 BRP maintained that IP retained the interests above the top 
of the Louark Group, which contained the Haynesville Shale.19 Chesapeake 
believes that it owned rights in the Haynesville Shale and the Bossier 
Shale.20 Both BRP and Chesapeake filed for summary judgment arguing 
that the language contained in the purchase and sale agreement was 
unambiguous.21  
According to David Liebtreu, the vice-president of IP, Chesapeake and 
IP only spoke of assigning rights to the Haynesville Shale.22 However, 
according to the letter of intent between IP and Chesapeake, Chesapeake 
offered to buy rights below the Cotton Valley Formation, which Liebtreu 
believed only included the Haynesville Shale.23 According to geology 
experts for BRP, the language contained in the agreement identified four 
different horizons that did not correlate to one another.24 One expert for 
BRP stated that the Bossier Shale was sometimes contained within the 
Louark Group.25 According to another expert for BRP, the base of the 
Cotton Valley Formation and the top of the Louark Group formation were 
separated by the Bossier Shale, with the Bossier Shale being part of the 
                                                                                                             
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at *2. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at *3. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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Cotton Valley Group and the Haynesville Shale being a part of the Louark 
Group.26 
John Sharp, a geoscience manager for Chesapeake, stated that the 
Bossier Shale was below the Cotton Valley Formation and above the 
Haynesville Formation and that in certain areas of Louisiana, the Bossier 
Formation falls into the Cotton Valley Group and in other areas, is in the 
Louark Group.27 According to an expert for Chesapeake, he believed that 
the wells correlated and that the Bossier Shale would fall below the horizon 
created by the depth limitation language in the agreement.28 The trial court 
agreed with Chesapeake that the language was not ambiguous and that the 
intent of IP was to retain its interest in the Cotton Valley Formation.29 The 
court found that the wells referenced in the description should be given 
consideration and found that those wells were located in the middle of the 
Bossier Shale Formation.30 The court also found that the well descriptions 
would include the Bossier C, which was the producing part of the Bossier 
Formation.31 
BRP appealed the judgment and argued that the language contained in 
the purchase and sale agreement was ambiguous, and as such, the correct 
interpretation would be that IP conveyed all interest in the minerals below 
the lowest depth listed, which is the top of the Louark Group.32 BRP 
maintained that the description was ambiguous as the base of the Cotton 
Valley Formation and top of the Louark Group were two different lines, 
separated by the Bossier Shale.33 The appellate court found that IP was only 
concerned with reserving the rights in the Cotton Valley Formation and 
affirmed the trial court’s decision.34 
C. Offers to Purchase Mineral Rights and Fraud 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana was asked to review a case wherein the 
plaintiffs, owners of a one-eighth royalty interest, brought suit against 
Evolution Petroleum Corporation (“Evolution”), the Lessees, seeking 
damages and rescission of a sale of their royalty interest, alleging fraud on 
                                                                                                             
 26. Id. at *4. 
 27. Id. at *5. 
 28. Id. at *7. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at *9-10. 
 33. Id. at *10. 
 34. Id. at *12. 
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Evolution’s part.35 Evolution entered into a purchase agreement with 
Denbury Resources, LLC (“Denbury”), in which Denbury would use CO2 
enhanced oil recovery technology that would increase productivity in its 
wells.36 Denbury believed that by using the CO2 technology, it could 
increase production from 145 barrels per day to potentially 30 to 40 million 
barrels.37 Evolution then made offers to purchase the plaintiffs’ royalty 
interest offering an amount equal to sixteen years of previous royalties, 
totaling $41,773.38 The plaintiffs believed that they were preyed upon by 
Evolution as they were elderly and not familiar with oil and gas matters.39 
They argued that there was a “relation of confidence” between the operators 
of the past and themselves, which led them to rely on Evolution’s 
statements and omissions, which amounted to fraud.40 
The district court and appellate court found that there was no cause of 
action; however, the appellate court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their 
petition and found that “the lessee’s duty to act as a reasonably prudent 
operator for the parties’ mutual benefit might require disclosure of the 
Denbury deal,” which in turn would be a cause of action for fraud and fraud 
by silence.41 The plaintiffs relied on Mineral Code art. 122, which stated 
that a lessee does not have a fiduciary obligation to the lessor, but must 
operate as a reasonably prudent operate to mutually benefit both himself 
and the lessor.42 What constitutes a reasonably prudent operator may be 
stipulated.43 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court that the language 
contained in the statute created a cause of action for fraud by silence.44 The 
plaintiffs argued that a duty arose for Evolution to disclose information 
about the sale to Denbury and recovery of reserves through operating the 
property.45 The Court found that Article 122 did not impose a duty to 
disclose information about that type of transaction, but rather imposed four 
obligations: an obligation to develop known formations, an obligation to 
explore and test all of the leased premises after discovering minerals in 
                                                                                                             
 35. McCarthy v. Evolution Petroleum Corp., 180 So. 3d 252, 254 (La. 2015). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 254-55. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 258. 
 45. Id. at 259. 
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paying quantities, an obligation to protect the leased property from 
drainage, and an obligation to produce and market those minerals.46 The 
Supreme Court stated that Article 122 dealt with the obligation of the lessee 
to develop a field, and not with the purchasing and selling of mineral 
assets.47 
The Supreme Court also disagreed with the appellate court’s finding for 
a cause of action for fraud.48 The appellate court found that Evolution had 
distracted the plaintiffs by using the assessment value on past production 
and that Evolution knew the minerals were more valuable than what they 
offered.49 The Supreme Court found that Article 17 of the Mineral Code 
prohibited rescission of a sale of a mineral right for lesion beyond moiety, 
which occurs when the agreed upon price is less than one half of the actual 
value of an immovable.50 Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the 
appellate court’s finding of a cause of action for fraud and fraud by 
silence.51 
D. Production in Paying Quantities 
In the early 1980s, three identical mineral leases were taken from Eva 
Mae Whorton, Henry Whorton, Wade Whorton, Hattie Flem, and others, 
covering 300 acres of land, which provided for a three-year primary term 
and a secondary term that called for “production of minerals or additional 
operations to maintain the leases beyond their primary term.”52 In 1983, the 
Louisiana Office of Conservation established a 480-acre unit, of which the 
Whorton leases contributed thirty acres.53A well was drilled within the unit, 
but was not located on the Whorton’s 300-acre tract.54 The leases in 
question contained no Pugh clause and were maintained as to the entire 300 
acres.55 In 2011, the well stopped producing and was subsequently plugged 
in 2013.56 
                                                                                                             
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 260. 
 48. Id. at 261. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 261, 264. 
 51. .Id. at 265. 
 52. Middleton v. EP Energy E & P Co., 188 So. 3d 263, 264 reh’g denied (2d Cir. 
2016). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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The current lessors asserted that the Whorton leases terminated for 
failing to produce in paying quantities and demanded a release of the lease 
from the working interest owners, which the defendants denied.57 As 
evidence, they asserted that between January 1990 and January 1994, the 
well produced no more than 1,000 MCF of natural gas and less than 100 
barrels of oil.58 The plaintiffs asked for a partial summary judgment 
terminating those leases. The trial court found that “operating a well at or a 
minimal profit for forty-one months is not sufficient to induce a reasonably 
prudent operator to continue production,” and ruled in the plaintiffs favor, 
ordering the leases had terminated on December 1, 1994.59 
The defendants asserted that in determining whether a well is producing 
in paying quantities, the court should take into account the production that 
occurred seventeen years after the period of alleged disruption of 
production. The defendants then argued that a reasonably prudent operator 
would continue to develop the well, despite the forty-one month reprieve. 60 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that in determining paying 
quantities, the court must take into account all factors that would influence 
a reasonable and prudent operator, including reservoir depletion, market 
price, relative profitability of other surrounding wells, operating costs, and 
net profit.61 The test is whether there is “a reasonable basis for the 
expectation of profitable returns from the well.”62 The defendants produced 
evidence showing that the well expenses at the time of the slow period of 
production were extraordinary and nonrecurring expenses, which are not 
considered operating expenses in the determination of producing in paying 
quantities.63 The appellate court found that there was a question of material 
fact as to whether or not a reasonably prudent operator would continue to 
operate that well and reversed the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs that 
terminated the mineral leases in 1994 and remanded the issue to the district 
court.64 
  
                                                                                                             
 57. Id. at 265. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 266. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 267. 
 64. Id. at 267-68. 
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E. Conveyance Language 
At issue in Keystone Energy Co. v. Denbury Onshore, LLC, is whether a 
1904 notarial act conveyed a right of way or a fee interest in a 6.29 acre 
tract.65 In 1904, Southwestern Rice and Canal Company conveyed an 
interest to Louisiana Western Railroad Company, pursuant to a notarial act, 
in 6.29 acres, which at the time of the conveyance, was located in Calcasieu 
Parish.66 A typed copy of the instrument was filed in Calcasieu Parish and 
Jefferson Davis Parish, a county that was later carved out of Calcasieu 
Parish.67 A handwritten copy of the instrument also existed and was later 
recorded in Jefferson Davis Parish in 2010.68 The handwritten and typed 
copies of the documents are similar in all regards, except that the typed 
versions contain a caption at the top of the document that states “Right of 
Way.”69 The term “Right of Way” does not appear in the handwritten 
version or anywhere in the body of both versions of the documents.70  
In 1999, Union Pacific, the successor of Louisiana Western Railroad 
Company, conveyed the property to the Dabovals in a quitclaim deed, 
reserving the minerals under the property.71 Union Pacific and Keystone 
entered into a lease covering the 6.29 acre tract, which was recorded in 
2010.72 The Dabovals also executed a lease with Suncoast Land Services, 
Inc., recorded in 2004.73 Suncoast then assigned the lease to Denbury and 
Hilcorp.74 Denbury spudded a well on the subject property in 2005.75 
Denbury and Hilcorp argued that Southwestern Rice intended to grant a 
right of way, and not an interest in fee to Louisiana Western Railroad 
Company, and accordingly, the Dabovals acquired the property through 
prescription.76 The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of 
Keystone, finding that the 1904 instrument transferred title in fee and did 
not convey a mere right of way.77  
                                                                                                             
 65. 188 So. 3d 458 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 66. Id. at 460. 
 67. Id. at 461. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 462. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 464. 
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The Second Court of Appeals found that there was conflicting evidence 
as to whether the 1904 instrument conveyed a fee interest or a right of way. 
The recitals in the document stated that the purpose of the conveyance was 
to allow for a railroad to “pass through” Southwestern’s land and “give an 
enhanced value to its Lands,” which shall be considered partial 
consideration.78 Due to the ambiguity in the language of the conveyance, 
the court considered extrinsic evidence, which included conveyances 
between the parties on the same date, a 2004 correspondence in which 
Union Pacific suggested they only had a right of way, and inconclusive 
evidence as to whether Southwestern or Louisiana Western Railroad 
Company were assed for property taxes.79 As a result, the court of appeals 
reversed the trial court’s partial summary judgment and remanded the issue 
to the lower court.80 
F. The Perpetual Nature of the Habendum Clause 
In Regions Bank v. Questar Exploration & Production Corp., mineral 
rights owners sued Exxon Mobil Company, the current owners of the three 
oil and gas leases, for failure to reasonably develop the leases.81 The 
plaintiffs filed suit declaring that the 1907 leases had terminated by 
operation of law pursuant to La. C.C. art 2679, which provides that a lease 
may not exceed ninety-nine years.82 The trial court found that La. C.C. art 
2679 did not apply to mineral leases.83 
The leases provided for a primary term of ten years and continued “as 
much longer thereafter as gas or oil is found or produced in paying 
quantities.”84 There were several hundred wells drilled pursuant to those 
leases; however, the mineral rights owners wanted a cancellation and 
release of the leases as to depths below six thousand feet alleging that the 
defendants did not reasonably develop the leases as to deeper depths.85 The 
owners later amended their petition and stated that the leases were 
terminated by operation of a Louisiana statute that states that leases may not 
exceed ninety-nine years.86 
                                                                                                             
 78. Id. at 466–67. 
 79. Id. at 468. 
 80. Id. 
 81. 184 So. 3d 260, 263, reh’g denied (2d Cir. 2016). 
 82. Id. at 261. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 262. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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The mineral owners appealed lower court’s ruling. The appellate court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that the leases were not 
perpetual, but rather were governed by the terms of the Louisiana Mineral 
Code, La. R. S. 31:115, which provided for a maximum secondary term 
based upon continuous drilling or operations or production.87 The court 
further found that Article 2679 of the Civil Code, which provides for a 
maximum lease term of ninety-nine years, does not apply to mineral leases 
because mineral leases are governed by the maximum term provided in the 
Mineral Code.88 As such, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s 
judgment in favor of the defendants.89 
G. Use of Lift Gas 
Red Willow Offshore, L.L.C. and Medco Energy US, L.L.C. were co-
working interest owners in a natural gas well.90 Not possessing the means to 
process the gas produced, they partnered with Palm Energy Offshore, 
L.L.C. (“Palm”), which had a production processing facility located 
approximately four miles away from the well.91 They entered into a 
Production Processing Agreement (“PPA”) in which Palm would allocate 
the gas volume to Red Willow and Medco based on a meter reading of the 
amount of gas that left the Palm processing facility and entered into the 
Tennessee Gas Sales Pipeline.92 Red Willow and Medco hired an auditing 
firm to audit the gas allocations.93 The auditing firm found that Palm was 
diverting a percentage of the gas allocation as “lift gas” to help Palm’s low-
pressure wells, which resulted in a financial loss of $1,163,587.90.94 The 
trial court ruled in favor of the Red Willow and Medco finding that Palm 
breached the PPA, which Palm then appealed.95  
The appellate court found that the PPA was silent on the use of 
processed gas as lift gas.96 The court found that the purpose of the PPA was 
to take the gas, process it, and deliver it for sale, and that the use of lift gas 
                                                                                                             
 87. Id. at 264-65. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Red Willow Offshore, LLC v. Palm Energy Offshore LLC, 185 So. 3d 293, reh’g 
denied (4th Cir. 2016). 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 295-96. 
 95. Id. at 296. 
 96. Id. at 298. 
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was an operational function, and not a processing function.97 The court 
cited to the American Petroleum Institute Manual, Section 6.2 and 
Statewide Order No. 29-D-1, which adopted the API manual, that states that 
“[m]ethods to account for fuel gas, lift gas, flare gas, and the like must be 
included in the design of an allocation program” and that once a number is 
adjusted for the lift gas, then a sales value may be found.98 The court also 
cited the Council of Petroleum Accountants Societies’ (“COPAS”) Gas 
Accounting Manual, which stated that lift gas can be purchased or 
transferred from other sources, but those sources are to be paid for the use 
of the gas, evidencing that lift gas is usually accounted for and allocated to 
producers for the value of that gas.99 The Fourth Circuit affirmed that trial 
court’s judgment that Palm’s use of the gas as lift gas was a breach of the 
PPA.100 
H. Lease Division 
In Guy v. Empress, L.L.C., the owners of a 140 acre-tract sought the 
release of the shallow rights of an oil and gas lease.101 The lease contained a 
continuous drilling clause, a vertical Pugh clause, a horizontal Pugh clause, 
and an assignment clause.102 The Lessors claimed that the lease was 
“horizontally divided” by an assignment in which the lessee, Long 
Petroleum, L.L.C. assigned to Empress, L.L.C., all right, title, and interest 
in depths from the surface to the base of the Cotton Valley formation.103 
Long spudded a well, the Edwards No. 1, in the shallow depths before the 
expiration of the primary term. Empress spudded a well, the Yarbrough No. 
1, after the expiration of the primary term.104  
The lessors claimed that the deep rights assignment divided the lease into 
two independent leases and that because the well drilled in the deep rights 
was commenced after the expiration of the primary term, the lease had 
expired as to the deep rights.105 Further, they argued that the lease also 
expired as to the shallow rights because the lessees did not engage in 
operations for the drilling, completion or reworking of a well ninety days 
                                                                                                             
 97. Id. at 299. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 300. 
 100. Id. at 303. 
 101. 193 So. 3d 177, reh’g denied (2d Cir. 2016). 
 102. Id. at 178–79.  
 103. Id. at 179. 
 104. Id. at 179–80. 
 105. Id. at 181. 
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after the Edwards No. 1 was shut in on December 31, 2011, pursuant to the 
continuous drilling operations clause.106 
The district court found that the working interest owners developed the 
premises according to the terms of the lease and that the question of 
whether the assignment created a sublease was immaterial.107 The Second 
Court of Appeals found that the lease was not divided by the assignment of 
the deep rights, citing the Mineral Code, which allows for the transfer of 
interest by assignment unless the lease specifically prohibits the 
assignment.108 Further, they found that the Lessees had complied with the 
continuous drilling clause in the lease. The Yarbrough No. 1 was spudded 
within the ninety-day period allotted by the continuous drilling clause.109 
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants. 110 
I. Tax Deed Property Descriptions 
In 1929, the heirs of A. V. Loftus came into possession of a 117-acre 
tract of land described as being the “North half of the Northeast Quarter, 
and the Southeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter, Section 8, Township 14 
N, Range 13 W; less three acres.”111 The tax assessment for the property 
described the tract as the “N ½ NE, Sec 8, SW NE Sec 8 Less 3 a . . . .”112 
In 1939, after failing to pay taxes, the State of Louisiana sold the property 
and reserved the mineral interest.113 The tax adjudication deed described the 
property as “N ½ of NE 1/4 (less three acres in SW Corner) and SE 1/4 of 
NE 1/4 of Sec 8…”.114 The State executed several oil and gas leases 
covering this property. Subsequently, numerous wells have been drilled on 
the property.115 
The current surface owners filed a petition to annul the 1939 tax deed 
stating that notice was not properly given to the Loftus heirs and that the 
property description in the deed did not properly describe the property so 
much so that identifying the land was impossible.116 The trial court found 
                                                                                                             
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 182. 
 108. Id. at 184. 
 109. Id. at 184–86.  
 110. Id. at 187. 
 111. Webb v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 194 So. 3d 41. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at 44. 
 116. Id. 
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that the property descriptions were sufficient enough to place the interested 
parties on notice.117 
The appellate court stated that a tax sale is void when the tax deed does 
not identify the property.118 The plaintiffs argued that the language “less 
three acres in the SW corner” made the property unidentifiable since the 
shape of the reserved acreage could not be determined by the description. 119 
The court found that the property description described the specific quarters 
and sections of the land and did not attempt to convey acreage in corners of 
the larger tracts.120 As such, the court found that the description contained 
in the assessment was reasonable enough so that the land could be 
identified and affirmed the district court’s judgment.121 
III. Legislative Activity 
A. Orphaned Wells 
Acts 2016, No. 342 amends Louisiana Revised Statute 30:91(B)(1) with 
regard to notice of a decision to declare an oilfield site orphaned and 
enacted R.S. 30:28(J).122 R.S. 30:28(J) requires the Commissioner of 
Conservation to give notice to the surface owner of a piece of property on 
which a well is located when an amended permit is issued to transfer 
ownership of a well from one operator to another within thirty days of 
issuing that permit.123 The “Surface Owner” is defined as the person that is 
currently on the tax assessor’s roll. 124 
Before R.S. 30:91(B)(1) was amended, the law only required the 
Assistant Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources to notify the 
last operator of record and publish a notice in the Louisiana Register when 
an oilfield site was determined to be orphaned.125 As amended by Senate 
Bill No. 165, the assistant secretary must continue to notify the last operator 
of record, publish notice in the Louisiana Register, and also notify the 
current surface owner.126 The surface owner will be found by the name on 
                                                                                                             
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 46. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 47. 
 121. Id.  
 122. 2016 La. Acts 342. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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the tax assessor’s roll. If the assistant secretary fails to notify the surface 
owners, then the decision to declare a site orphaned will be invalidated.127 
Acts 2016, No. 583, which began as Senate Bill No. 428, enacts 
Louisiana Revised Statute 30:88.1, which provides for the use of funds 
coming from orphans wells for oilfield site restoration.128 R.S. 30:88.1 
defines an orphan well as an oil and gas well that is part of an oilfield site 
determined as being orphaned as of August 1, 2016 and thereafter, and has 
no production for longer than two years.129 A portion of the money derived 
from tax on the oil, gas, and condensate from an orphan well shall be given 
to a site-specific trust, which once fully funded shall be given to the state 
secretary.130 If there is new production from orphaned wells, then another 
account will be established to provide a source of funds for restoration of 
the oilfield site.131 An assessment by an approved assessment contractor 
will be made to determine the site restoration requirements and costs.132 
B. Financial Security 
Acts 2016, No. 634, which began as House Bill 632, provides for the 
amount of financial security required by drilling permit applicants.133 R.S. 
30:4 requires a party requesting or amending a drilling permit to provide 
financial security to the Commissioner of the Office of Conservation. 134 
The amount of financial security for an individual well that is three 
thousand feet or less is two dollars per foot.135 Otherwise, the amount of 
financial security will be in accordance with the Administrative Procedure 
Act.136 There is no financial security required for wells declared to be 
orphaned, which are subsequently transferred to another operator or wells 
that have an agreement to be plugged or have been declared orphaned by 
the commissioner.137 
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C. Imprescriptible Servitudes 
Acts 2016, No. 60 amends R.S. 31:149(B) dealing with mineral rights 
reserved by people in land acquired by governments or agencies.138 R.S. 
31:149(B) stated that land acquired by a governmental agency through “act 
of sale, exchange, donation, or other contract, or by condemnation, or 
expropriation” with a mineral reservation subject to the prescription of 
nonuse, that mineral right is not subject to the prescription as long as the 
land remains with the government or an agency thereof.139 The instrument 
by which the government acquires the land must reflect the intent to reserve 
the mineral right and their imprescriptibility.140 House Bill No. 634 adds 
“appropriation” as to the ways the government entity can obtain the land.141 
D. Mail Solicitation Act 
Acts 2016, No. 179 is a newly created law that regulates the solicitation 
of offers for mineral rights through the mail.142 This act, however, does not 
apply if there was a “meaningful exchange” between the purchaser and the 
seller.143 In the event that there is a sale by mail solicitation, the act requires 
that the transferring document state that it is a sale of mineral rights by 
solicitation through the caption.144 If the document contains the disclosure, 
then the seller of the mineral rights can rescind the agreement after sixty 
days on the date the document is signed.145 If the document does not 
contain the disclosure required by the act, then the purchaser can rescind 
after three years from the signature date.146 Further, the purchaser will be 
liable for attorney and court costs if the disclosure is not noted on the 
instrument.147 If the option to rescind is exercised, the seller must return any 
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